Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore the issue of transsexuality within the legal and criminal frameworks of the United States, Japan, and Iran. While the cultural and historical aspects of transsexuality have been broadly scrutinized within academia, a comparative criminal justice perspective has yet to be constructed. This paper is not meant to provide a definitive account on this subject matter, but to rather shed some light on a substantially underdeveloped topic.
I have chosen to look at the United States, Japan, and Iran for two primary reasons. First, each nation has a distinct cultural and historical background. Whereas countries like the United States and Britain largely developed from the same legal tradition, the U.S., Japan, and Iran have fundamentally disparate judicial and social philosophies. Second, all three countries have recently considered the issue of transsexuality, and come to dramatically different conclusions. These conclusions will likely be surprising to anyone who views the United States as overly litigious, Japan as comparatively enlightened, or Iran as purely repressive. This failure to conform to expectations not only highlights the complexity of comparative criminal justice, but also reveals the existence of seemingly contradictory narratives within even a single national discourse.
1
Although often confused, the phrases transgender and transsexual have two distinct meanings. A transgendered individual is someone whose physical gender (male or female) diverges significantly from his or her 'gender identity' (Ryan and Futterman, 1998 ). Many transgendered individuals will refuse to look, act, or generally conform to a specific traditional gender, while others will adopt the role of their gender opposite. If acting according to the latter, an individual is generally regarded as a transsexual.
Transsexuals literally feel born in the wrong sexual body, and (clinically) are said to suffer from gender dysphoria or Gender Identity Disorder (www.behavenet.com). Not all transsexuals undergo sexual reassignment surgery i , but those who go from male to female I shall abbreviate as MtFs and those from female to male as FtMs. Admittedly, I have oversimplified an extremely complex phenomenon; the terms 'gender' and 'sex' should not be used interchangeably, and debate still exists on whether transsexuality is a genetic or psychological condition (or even a 'condition' at all) ii .
Aspects of transsexualism have been observed within nearly every country, and there thus exist a variety of methodological sources. The vast majority of my information was gathered through books, periodical articles, LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered) reports, academic studies and criminal statistics. In the course of my research I encountered many documents written in only Japanese or Farsi iii , and I can therefore make no claim to have conducted an entirely comprehensive academic review.
Transsexuality is truly a global phenomenon, and as we shall see, this has resulted in a great variety of domestic responses.
2
The United States of America
The United States government has long adopted a marginal stance towards transsexuality. This is likely due to the nation's federalist tradition, granting (partial) state jurisdiction regarding the criminal law. Interestingly, most states have generally taken a hands-off approach as well, valuing medical discretion over legal prohibition. While transsexuals can freely undergo sexual reassignment surgery, such state disregard has ultimately proven a double-edged sword: transsexuals need not fear criminal punishment, but also enjoy little government protection or statistical recognition.
The first case of transsexualism to garner widespread attention within the United
States (and indeed much of the world) was that of Christine Jorgensen (Meyerowitz, 2002) . In March of 1959 Jorgensen, who had undergone hormonal treatment in order to physically alter her body from female to male, applied for a marriage license iv at the New York City Municipal Court Building. While the license was eventually refused, the case almost immediately became a sensation within the nation's tabloids. Recognizing
Jorgensen's situation, a number of other males and females began openly asking doctors to alter their sex, and reassignment surgeries found a growing American market.
The matter of transsexuality has traditionally proven a challenge within both (Meyerowitz, 2002) .
Transsexual voices have proven even more muffled within the American criminal law. As one scholar has noted, the recent past saw 'nothing less than widespread legislative avoidance' of this issue (Meyer, 1999 conducting such procedures has never led to criminal prosecution (Meyerowitz, 2002 (Bridy, 2004) . As the transsexual community has became more and more recognized, however, many doctors have undoubtedly recognized the profit potential in catering towards this particular clientele.
Although doctors have never been prosecuted for the surgery itself, (pre and post) transsexuals have faced a long history of arrest for simply going out in public.
Throughout the 1960s cross-dressing laws were widely in effect, and transsexuals could be penalized under vagrancy or obscenity statutes (Bridy, 2004) . Such arrests became more rare as the 60s progressed, and many obscenity laws gradually invalidated by the growingly liberal courts. Further, state judges began to become increasingly annoyed by police crowding their courts with alternative unisex stylists, and (for the most part)
successfully demanded an end to cross-dressing prosecutions.
The most serious criminal issues affecting transsexuals have resulted more from a lack of government attention than an excess of it. Although continually victimized, transsexuals have remained conspicuously absent from many state and federal hate crime statutes. Even more remarkably, there are no reliable statistics on the actual amount of crimes committed against transsexuals, and they have thus been labeled "hidden victims" (Meyer, 1999) .
The relative obscurity of transsexual victimhood is perhaps best reflected by this group's total absence within the Federal Hate Crime Prevention Act, passed through
Congress in 1994 and renewed on a number of subsequent occasions (www.adl.org).
Although various congressmen have vocally protested this omission, they have also acknowledged too much protest may put the act itself in jeopardy (Lochhead, 2007) . Transsexual needs have also begun to gain notice in prison. Currently, inmates are segregated based upon genitals alone, and many transsexuals may therefore face particular abuse or harassment (Brooks, 1999 of the Matthew Shepard Act has highlighted transsexual rights to an unprecedented degree, it is unlikely to overcome a presidential veto. Further, the records on transsexual assaults remain sketchy at best, and there has been no popular movement to report them more accurately. Although the nation's current transsexuals rarely face the illusion of mayhem statutes or threats of arrest under vagrancy or obscenity charges, the United State's criminal justice system has yet to fully meet the needs of this oft-ignored group.
The American transsexual ultimately remains a hidden victim, who many would rather ignore entirely than discomfortingly face.
Japan
Although transsexuals have played a traditionally more open role within Japanese society than that of the United States', Japan's government has proven considerably more repressive. While violence against the estimated 70,000 transgendered is virtually unheard of, sexual reassignment surgery was strictly illegal until the 'discovery' of Gender Identity Disorder in the late 1990s (Larkin, 2007) . The largest battles have now switched from criminal to civil law, as Japanese advocates continue to fight for legal and political recognition.
Throughout Japanese history, Kabuki shows thrived on males assuming female roles (Compton, 2003) . While many individuals resumed their 'masculine' identity after the show's finale, others publicly refused to ever adopt a fixed sex. Rising to power in the late nineteenth-century, the autocratic Meiji government dramatically and ruthlessly disparaged such 'perverse' individuals viii . Intimidating and imprisoning any supposed sexual deviant, state officials aggressively removed transsexual (and transgendered) figures from the public sphere. While restrictions were again loosened in the late 1940s, transsexual individuals became largely limited to bar shows, clubs, and massage parlors (McLelland, 2004) . Largely relegated to the entertainment industry, such 'sexual outlaws' thus occupied a relatively circumscribed and limited role within early postWorld War II Japanese society.
As sexual reassignment surgery became more known, Japanese transsexuals began to demand their own domestic physicians. This became legally unfeasible, however, as Clause 28 of the 1948 Eugenic Protection Act strictly prohibited the 9 'unnecessary' sterilization of healthy sexual organs (Hiroyuki, 2006 (Hiroyuki, 2006) . Eventually found guilty of violating Clause 28 of the Eugenic Protection Law, the surgeon's resulting detention almost universally deterred Japanese doctors from performing further sexual reassignment surgeries. Of course, Japanese transsexuals did not disappear entirely, as they were able to get surgery abroad or undergo a variety of hormonal treatments. Flying to Thailand or the United States was restricted only to the wealthier citizens, however, and black-market hormonal 'solutions'
were often rife with dangerous side effects (Mackie, 2001) .
It took over three decades for clause 28 of the Eugenic Protection Act to be legally overturned. This resulted from a number of gradual but distinct events. Firstly, the tojisha ('the party concerned') movement began to gain political prominence throughout much of Japan in the early to mid 1990s (Lunsing, 2005 (Ellis, 2000: 72) . In this changing paradigm, transsexual individuals were no longer viewed as deliberate social misfits, but people with a serious and potentially curable medical disorder. Notions of Gender Identity
Disorder thus started to permeate the academic literature, and transsexuality was linguistically transformed from a 'choice' into a 'condition'.
Following an upsurge of tojisha lobbying and accepting a medicalized discourse on transsexuality, in 1996 four doctors at the Saitama Medical College asked an ethics committee if they could perform sexual reassignment surgery on two (newly-labeled) GID patients (Hiroyuki, 2006) . Similarly influenced by the growing medical literature and political pressure from Occur, the Japanese Society of Psychiatry and Neurology formally allowed the operations to commence. Claiming the patients to have been 'cured' of their previous 'affliction', a number of medical and tojisha activists subsequently lobbied the Japanese diet to fully legalize sexual reassignment surgery.
Acknowledging clause 28 to be medically outdated, the diet did so in 1998, but with the stipulation that surgery only be performed on patients diagnosed with GID by two separate physicians. While most advocates have fervently praised the diet's action, others have pointed out the bizarre 'contract of future promises' that pre-ops must sign. Among other things, this contract supposedly contains a pledge not to work in the entertainment industry, a profession in which many transsexual people have traditionally found employment x (Lunsing, 2005: 147) .
While sexual reassignment surgery can no longer result in criminal prosecution for the doctor or patient, a number of civil issues still remain. In 2003 the diet passed the Exceptional Treatment Act for People with GID, allowing transsexuals to bindingly change their legal (and not just physical) sex. Five strict conditions need to be met, however, in order for an individual to successfully complete this process: (1) the individual must be over twenty years old, (2) not be married (to supposedly avoid coercion), (3) be childless, (4) have no gonad function, and (5) have genitals similar to 'other members of the sex' to which they were reassigned (Hiroyuki, 2006: 4) . While the Act was easily passed in the diet, many tojisha groups have derided it as needlessly strict and socially repressive. More recent debates have revolved around employment discrimination towards transgendered and transsexuals, and whether office managers have the right to know this feature of a person's history (Lunsing, 2005) .
Unlike in the United States, physical violence against Japan's transsexual community is considerably uncommon. As one author remarked, 'drag queens as well as transvestites live openly and in public places without problems' (Lunsing, 2005) . This is likely both a reflection of the nations comparatively low violent crime rate, and the traditional prevalence of cross-dressers within Japanese society. Of course, no larger empirical studies have been conducted (that I am aware of), and the possibility of a hidden victimhood therefore undoubtedly remains. There have been no major studies conducted on Japan's transsexual prison population either, and it is thus unknown whether they face similar harassment to that in the United States.
Although generally safe from street-level crime, until recently Japan's transsexuals were legally handcuffed by a demoralized nation's medico-rational ideology.
Espousing primitive notions of motherhood and upholding a classic eugenic discourse, the Japanese government sought to actively restrict one's control over his or her body.
Transsexuals were thus rarely viewed as inherently obscene (as in the United States), but rather as threats to a larger communal future. Only when the medical narrative was transformed, and this group viewed as sick rather than defiant, could the desired physical alteration be magnanimously granted.
Iran
In a nation generally considered to be among the most repressive on Earth, it is difficult to imagine an open or liberal policy regarding transsexuality. Yet despite communally stoning adulterers and publicly hanging male homosexuals, Iran has been called 'the sex change capital of the world' (Tait, 2005) . Blessed by the Grand Ayatollah himself, sexual reassignment surgery is both fully legal and even federally funded.
Indeed, similar to the United States, the greatest threat against Iranian transsexuals comes not from the state but from the streets.
Unlike Japan, Persia does not have a long history of transsexual performances or gender subversive literature. While homoerotic tales were relatively common, few 13 stories (that I could locate) challenge or transform traditional gender roles (www.GLBTQ.com). Although historically indeterminable, transsexuality is thus considered a relatively novel phenomenon within Iranian culture. Indeed, during the Shah's regime there was no legal mention of transsexuality at all, and while such procedures were therefore not expressly illicit, it is unclear whether they were allowed; no early Iranian advocates of transsexuality have come forward, and there is no record (at least in English) of pre-1979 transgendered cases.
In 1963 the future founder of the Islamic Iranian nation, Ayatollah Khomeini, wrote a popular book discussing contemporary scientific ethics (Harrison, 2005) .
Determining that there were no Koranic prohibitions against sexually corrective surgery, Khomeini declared such procedures to be religiously permissible. While this passage has been held up as early proof of Khomeini's tolerance towards sexual reassignment surgery, transsexuality was not actually addressed in his book. Khomeini had exclusively considered the issue of hermaphrodites, and made no specific mention of transsexuality (Tait, 2005) . It is unlikely that Khomeini had ever even heard of such a concept at the time, and therefore certainly had little opinion regarding this issue.
Upon coming to power, Khomeini and his Iranian reformers instituted a strict regime of Shar'ia Law. Among the harshest penalties involved so-called Lavat, or sodomy, punishable by heavy flogging or even death (Human Rights Watch, 2005) .
While it is unknown how many Iranian homosexuals have actually been executed, the number is believed to be relatively low. This may be because of the difficulty in legally proving homosexual activity (four witnesses are required) or, more likely, a popular policy of 'collective denial' (Alizadeh and Poore, 2007) . Originally, transsexuality and homosexuality were grouped together; Iranian transsexuals were simply considered gay, and hence punishable to the same degree as any other practitioner of Lavat (Tait, 2007) .
The story of how transsexuality became legalized within Iran is surely romanticized, and its exact accuracy is ultimately unimportant. Regardless, it is confirmed that a (pre-op) MtF named Mayam Katoon Malkara continually lobbied for Ayatollah Khomeini's recognition, and actually burst into his palace dressed as a male (Tait, 2005) . Eventually brought to the Supreme Leader by Khomeini's son, Malkara is said to have dramatically revealed her breasts and fervently described her condition as a 'disease'. Convinced that his earlier writings applied not only to hermaphrodites but transsexuals, the Ayatollah consequently issued a fatwa (or religious decree) formally legalizing transsexual operations. While homosexuality and cross-dressing have remained highly illegal, Khomeini himself thus legitimated transsexual operations within
Iran.
Similarly to Japan, in Iran transsexuality is principally viewed as a disease So far, the ruling elite has been reluctant to reverse Khomeini's 'enlightened' decision. The current Ayatollah has publicly supported sexual reassignment surgery, and the President xi , despite his ideologically extreme record, has never overtly addressed this issue. A prominent Iranian scholar has even recently published a dissertation on Iranian transsexualism, attempting to ground it within Persia's prevailing legal framework (Tait, 2005) . Matters of particular importance are whether a wife can get surgery without her husband's position, and when the marriage itself is to be considered voided by the state.
Issues of civil law are considerably more progressive than in Japan or the United States;
Iranian transsexuals are able to get a new driver's license and birth certificate almost immediately, and are legally reassigned gender without much technical hassle.
To legally get a sex change in Iran, an individual must be of consenting age and judged 'mentally ill' due to Sexual Identity Disorder (Islamic Thinkers Society, 2006) .
Combining religious and legal discourses, it is a clerical judge, and not a doctor, who grants the final permission to proceed. It is unknown how many transsexual operations have actually been performed in Iran, but the number is considered remarkably high.
One doctor reported that he had done approximately 300 sexual reassignment surgeries in Iran within the last decade, compared with around 40 in all of Europe (Harrison, 2005) .
Despite the government's surprising liberalism, Iranian transsexuals are said to suffer considerable criminal harassment and violence. While the state may bless sexual reassignment surgery, such patients are often still considered homosexuals or perverts by their local community (Eqbali, 2004) . Indeed, most violence is likely inter-familial, inflicted on transsexual (and transgendered) individuals by their own parents or siblings.
As one news source reported, 'transsexuals in Iran continue to suffer not just ostracism, but physical attacks' (Mangez, 2005 (Mangez, 2005) .
It is both puzzling and ironic that one of the most religiously repressive nations on Earth has proven a virtual epicenter for transsexual openness. Even more ironic is that such opportunity only arose through absolute tyranny; indeed, there are few more comprehensive or effective policies than those enabled by religious decree. By equating Gender Identity Disorder with an affliction like cancer, Iran's transsexual debate has been supported and legitimized by a larger medico-religious discourse. The sexually 'confused' were granted their freedom, as long as homosexuality itself remained the same old unnamable but ever-perilous specter.
Conclusion
Despite their discrete cultural heritages, the issue of transsexuality has certain parallels within the United States, Japan, and Iran. Of course, due to each nation's unique legal structure, one must always be careful when extrapolating supposed similarities. Regardless, I believe three core themes can be reliably recognized and explored. reliably documented that Japanese transsexuals can walk the streets openly and safely.
Iranian abuses have almost exclusively arisen from first-hand accounts, which provide a powerful but ultimately limited picture.
The legal situation facing transsexuals in the United States, Japan and Iran is ultimately daunting but hopeful. Sexual reassignment surgery is legal in all three countries, but the danger of being a transsexual (with the possible exception of Japan)
remains a day-to-day reality. As mentioned earlier, it is somewhat problematic to even compare such unique entities; U.S. federalism, for example, has little parallel with Iranian autocracy. The possibility of educative tolerance also varies significantly from country to country. Japan's long held tradition of ambivalent gender roles bends to larger communal interests, and the law can likely do little to change this. As one commentator remarked, 'Japan, unlike the United States, is not a very litigious society…Much more important than legal developments are developments in the social field', including the advance of written sources, Internet forums and the increasing prevalence of queer youth culture (Lunsing, 2005: 148 
EndNotes
i Since the allowance of sexual reassignment surgery is such an obvious and important indicator of a country's stance towards transsexuality, the legal status of this procedure will be prominently detailed within each nation reviewed.
ii For the purposes of this paper, however, such larger complexities will have to be temporarily (and regrettably) ignored.
iii Which accounts for the significantly lengthier section on the United States.
iv In order to marry a female v Certain U.S. Representatives, such as Barney Frank, have expressed some support for the transgendered and transsexual community, but usually only in tangent with larger
LGBT causes (Lochhead, 2007) .
vi Later detailed in the 1999 independent film Boys Don't Cry vii Although there have been no comprehensive empirical studies performed on offenders' purposes for attacking transsexuals, their motivations are usually considered an alternative form of homophobia known as 'transphobia' (www.transgenderlaw.org).
viii It is unclear whether the Western emulating Meijis sought to superficially adopt Occidental sex codes or merely to crack down on all marginal, seemingly deviant behaviors.
ix So-called because transsexual individuals were popularly known as 'Blue Boys' (the phrase itself was taken from a Parisian transvestite show popular in Japan).
x I unfortunately could not locate any document (in English) explaining the logic of this pledge and therefore do not have enough knowledge to speculate on its deeper origins.
21
xi Who ultimately serves as a mouthpiece for the Ayatollah
